Why would voters resort to a statewide tax limitation to force change in their own local government? This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that property tax limitations succeeded because they allowed voters to lower tax rates in other communities. Statewide limitations effectively extend the voting franchise to individuals who have no standing in local elections. Voters may have preferences for tax and expenditure levels in other jurisdictions because they receive rents from employment in those jurisdictions, directly own taxable assets in those jurisdictions, or because changes in other jurisdictions might influence their own residential location choice. Empirical tests of this hypothesis focus on the Massachusetts experience with Proposition 2½, which passed in 1980. Voting patterns, household mobility patterns, and post-Proposition growth in property values all support the nonresident hypothesis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly a quarter century after California's Proposition 13 began a "tax revolt" aimed at limiting local government revenue collection, researchers continue to debate the causes and consequences of tax limitations. 1 The persistence of interest in this phenomenon can be attributed to two reasons. First, tax limitations continue to appear with some frequency on state ballots and voters continue to support them. 2 Second, the canonical economic model of local public choice suggests that rational voters would never choose to adopt a binding limit on their ability to raise reve nue locally. 3 Tax limitations thus pose a theoretical puzzle.
One intriguing piece of this puzzle has difficulty fitting in with existing explanations for property tax limitations: why would voters choose to take statewide action to limit their local government? The use of limitations to restrain "Leviathan" local governments should be most effective when the limitations are tailored to local voter preferences and voted on only by the local electorate. 4 The claims that tax limitations were responses to statewide changes in public school 2 financing or were initiatives to force the state to take more responsibility for local public goods overlook the fact that local voters in this type of scenario frequently have incentives to avoid reducing tax rates in other jurisdictions.
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This paper argues that one basic purpose of local tax limitations is to allow voters to influence local tax and expenditure decisions in jurisdictions where they do not reside. This hypothesis implies that tax limitations are most likely to succeed at the state level, even when a majority of voters in any single jurisdiction would oppose a unilaterally imposed limitation. Voters have preferences over tax and spending levels in other jurisdictions for several reasons. Benefit spillovers between jurisdictions are the most commonly cited rationale in the post-Tiebout literature.
These spillovers should lead nonresidents to desire higher levels of taxation and expenditure in any given jurisdiction. This paper focuses on three additional rationales, each of which would lead nonresidents to desire lower tax and expenditure levels. The first rationale considers the role of absentee landowners, including both owners of renter-occupied housing and nonresidential land and structures. The second focuses on nonresident employees, who expect higher wages if lower taxes on structural capital cause more investment that raises the marginal product of labor. The third rationale examines "marginal residents," or individuals for whom a discrete change in the tax and expenditure levels in a particular jurisdiction would cause them to re-optimize their residential location decision and potentially realize gain s in utility.
Data from Massachusetts' 1980 property tax limitation, Proposition 2½, are used to test the nonresident hypothesis. Analysis is conducted on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, with 6 See note 3 supra.
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observations from a non-tax limitation, or "control" state, Connecticut, included to separate out possible confounding trends. Evidence considered includes patterns of voter support for the tax limitation measure across jurisdictions, household mobility patterns in the decade following the limitation's passage, and trends in property values over the same decade. The results, discussed in Section III, generally support the nonresident explanation.
The nonresident theory of tax limitations is decidedly more pessimistic than either of its alternatives. Both the Leviathan and state bailout hypotheses model property tax limitations as potential Pareto improvements. In the nonresident world, there may be clear losers when tax limitations are passed -the voters who desired high property tax rates in the first place. When not all interested parties have the right to vote in local elections, however, tax limitations may still be efficiency-enhancing. Section IV returns to this observation and concludes.
II. THE NONRESIDENT EXPLANATION AND ITS RIVALS
The central puzzle of property tax limitations is set up by the literature following Tiebout's analysis of consumer choice of local public good bundles. 6 In the Tiebout model, heterogeneous utility-maximizing agents achieve a Pareto efficient outcome by sorting themselves into homogeneous local jurisdictions, each one offering the combination of local taxes and services most preferred by its residents. In this model, a binding property tax limitation prevents some jurisdictions from offering residents their most preferred combination of taxes and services, leading to a clear decrease in utility for those residents. No individual jurisdiction would ever voluntarily submit to such a restriction, so long as residents retained the power to optimally set local taxes and 4 services.
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If the Tiebout model is amended to permit voters to have preferences over taxes and spending levels in jurisdictions where they do not otherwise reside, situations may arise where a majority of voters in a system of jurisdictions would support a limitation measure. As mentioned in the introduction, the existence of benefit spillovers should lead voters to support increases, rather than decreases, in taxes and spending in jurisdictions where they do not reside. There are three countervailing arguments to support the case where nonresidents favor lower taxes and service provision in a particular jurisdiction.
Nonresident landowners. When only residents have the right to set local tax rates and expenditure levels, the "optimal," or resident welfare-maximizing tax rate on any commodity increases when nonres idents consume a greater share of the co mmodity. 8 A system of local jurisdictions where many individuals reside in one community but own property in another may therefore find itself in a form of prisoners' dilemma. Each jurisdiction's dominant strategy is to set relatively high property tax rates in order to expropriate revenue from nonresidents for the benefit of residents. 9 A majority of voters in the system, however, might support an agreement to limit each supra note 8, who model a local government as setting tax rates on commodities that trade at exogenously fixed prices. The price of land and structures in a jurisdiction, however, is endogenous and should capitalize the degree of confiscatory ta xation. W hereas in an A rnott and G rieson-type m odel con sumers in a system of jurisdictions could benefit from lo wer net-of-tax p rices if they collud e, in this scenario the benefit wo uld accrue primarily as a w indfall increase in property values.
11 When reloc ation costs are low, firms may respond to local taxes by moving to jurisdictions that pro mise lower tax rates. Jurisdictions, in return, may set lower tax rates in order to prevent this relocation. The presence of either physical relocation costs or agglomeration economies that are specific to a single jurisdiction would reduce this mitigating effect.
12 Firm departure would be expected to decrease wages in the short run until households have an opportunity to respond by migrating. Olivier J. Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz, Regional Evolutions, 1 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 1 (1992) show that migration responses to statewide employment shocks are common, but occur over a perio d of years. 5 jurisdiction's tax revenue in order to minimize distortionary losses from commodity taxation.
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Nonresident employees. Other things equal, taxation of investments in land and structural capital should cause firms to use other production inputs more intensively. Under the standard assumption of diminishing marginal product, tax-induced increases in labor intensity reduce the marginal product of labor and have the potential to decrease equilibrium wages. 11 Equilibrium wages in a system of local jurisdictions may decline still further if local taxes push some firms outside the system altogether, to other regions that offer incentives or other commitments to a low tax burden. 12 Employees who reside in the same jurisdiction as the firm should take these wage effects into account when setting local tax rates. Nonresident employees, on the other hand, have an incentive to seek lower tax rates in the communities where they work. To the extent that systemwide wage levels are capitalized into property values, even nonresidents with no ties to employment in other jurisdictions may have preferences over tax rates in those jurisdictions.
Marginal residents. Lower tax rates and public good provision levels in a particular jurisdiction might change the rank order of bids for housing in that jurisdiction. Suppose, for example, that firms are disproportionately located in a single central jurisdiction to take advantage of transportation connections or agglomeration economies. Residents of that jurisdiction, vested with the power to set local tax rates, will set high rates that effectively capture some of the rents associated with the community's locational advantage. Across the system of jurisdictions, households with a strong taste for local public goods will be drawn to this community, because of its superior technology in producing public goods -for any given per-household tax burden, the quantity of public goods produced will be greater. These households' willingness to pay a premium to reside in a jurisdiction with a better public good production technology will in many cases enable them to outbid other households in the market for land and housing.
A systemwide tax limitation deprives this jurisdiction of its public good production technology, making it less attractive to existing residents. Households that re-optimize their location decisions following property tax limitations form part of the hypothesized nonresident coalition. Household resorting in the wake of property tax limitations is not a unique prediction of the nonresident hypothesis, however. The restraint of a Leviathan government, for example, may prompt some households to move into former high-tax jurisdictions. Moreover, in each explanation, the set of voters most likely to re-optimize should resemble the set that supports a limitation in the first place: individuals with either a high tax price 18 Household reso rting provides an alternative explana tion for Shapiro and S onstelie's (supra note 4)
finding that the marginal rates of substitution between types of pubic goods changed in California after Proposition 13. Shapiro and Sonstelie interpret this evidence as suggesting that a different agent chose the public bundle before and after the limitation, and conclude that the two agents were Leviathan bure aucrats and median vo ters, respectively. Resorting implies that the optimizing agents may have been median voters in both cases, but that the identity of the median voter in each jurisdiction changes after the limitation is imposed. The nonresident hypothesis suggests a more complex pattern. The value of property other than owner-occupied housing should increase, since lower taxes imply that owners of this type of property will be able to capture a greater share of the rents from it. Resident owner-occupiers benefit from a reduction in tax rates but also suffer from a decrease in local public good provision. If the median voter in a jurisdiction is an owner-occupier, it can be inferred that the median voter's 21 Dennis Epple a nd Thom as Romer, M obility and Redistribution, 99 J. P ol. Econ. 828 (1 991) presents a model of equilibrium in local jurisdictions where the marginal resident is referred to as a "border" household. 22 In either the Leviathan or state bailout scenarios, higher property value increases in constrained commu nities that initially oppo sed the limitation could be observed if some unob served facto r correlated with both high initial tax rates and opposition increased demand in certain jurisdictions. In the context of the model above, demand for the amenity present in one jurisdiction might be increasing independently. To address the concerns that unobserved factors c ontaminate the relationship betwee n tax rate reductions and pro perty value changes, 10 satisfaction with the tax rate and service level in the jurisdiction declines after the limitation is passed. The equilibrium value of owner-occupied property in a community, however, is determined not by the median voter but rather by a marginal resident -one indifferent between that jurisdiction and its closest alternative. 21 Depending on the marginal resident's preferences, a constrained community could become either more or less attractive, leading to either an increase or decrease in owner-occupied housing prices.
While overall trends in property values cannot reliably distinguish between the set of proposed explanations for property tax limitations, the theories are distinct in their forecasts of the correlation between support for the limitation measure and property value changes in constrained jurisdictions. If prospectively constrained communities that support a limitation are those that feature Leviathan governments, or those whose residents stand to benefit most from switching to a new state fiscal regime, then any property value increases should be concentrated in those jurisdictions that display more support. Opposition to the limitation should indicate a community that prefers a high tax level or whose residents would suffer under a switch to a new regime.
Under the nonresident explanation, opposition to a limitation measure should be strongest among those households that benefit from a system that allows greater tax exporting to nonresidents.
The greatest increase in property values should therefore be observed in communities that opposed the limitation -those that extracted the most rents from nonresidents through high property taxes.
22
observations from a "control" state, Connecticut, will be included in the empirical analysis below. The identifying assumption is that any observed factor correlated with high initial tax rates in Massaschusetts, where initial tax rates were force d to decline , will also correla te with high initial tax rate s in Connec ticut. Regression observations, which correspond to Massachusetts jurisdictions, are weighted by the total number of votes cast. This procedure allows some inferences about individual behavior to be made 27 This pro cedure p rovides b ehavioral p arameters u nder certain conditions. F irst, the standard logit assumption s must apply, tha t is, an individual i, living in jurisdiction j must support the limitation when Y ij = X ij $ + , ij exceeds some threshold value, and , ij take on an i.i.d. Weibull distribution. Second, for the parameters in the aggregated regression to be equal to those in the individual regression, either X ij must contain jursidiction characteristics exclusively, or individuals must not base their decisions on the X ij values of other jurisdiction residents. T he standard concerns r egarding m odel spec ification app ly. 28 The log m andated ta x rate reduc tion is used in all sp ecifications to fac ilitate the comp utation of elasticity estimates. Sub stituting the level of the mandated tax rate redu ction doe s not significantly alter a ny results. Substituting a dummy variable to indicate whether a jurisdiction was constrained eliminates the statistical significance o f the demog raphic resu lts reported in Tables 4 and 5 , but n ot in the prop erty value results re ported in Table 6 . 29 In reality, the provisions of Proposition 2 ½ forced most jurisdictions to lower their property tax rates below 2.5% over time, since tax collections were constrained to grow at a rate below that of inflation. Jurisdictions can vote to override the Proposition's growth provisions, however, so I treat any tax rate reductions beyond the 2.5% limit as endogenous here an d in later tables. 30 The set of to wns surroun ding a partic ular jurisdictio n is defined to exclude the jurisdiction itself.
A. The Voting Data
Average reductions in surrounding towns are weighted by the population of those towns. The correlation between a jurisdiction's own tax rate reduction and average reductions in surrounding towns is 0.411 -significant, though not large enough to create severe collinearity problems. The estimated effect of surrounding tax reductions on support for Proposition 2½ increases when larger radius measures are used. The alternative explanation that residents use tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions to predict their own future tax rate is thus only valid if residents attach more weight to more distant jurisdictions. The first regression in Table 2 provides a simple comparison of the impact of prospective tax rate changes within a jurisdiction and in the communities neighboring that jurisdiction. A neighboring jurisdiction in this case is defined as one with a population centroid within 20 miles of that of the city or town in question. 30 As the nonresident hypothesis predicts, support for the Proposition is significantly higher among voters who live near, rather than in, high tax jurisdictions. This is a substantial relationship: controlling for a jurisdiction's own prospective tax rate reduction, a one-standard-deviation increase in average rate reduction in the surrounding area predicts a 1.2 standard deviation increase in support for the Proposition. Controlling for tax reductions in the surrounding area, jurisdictions with higher initial tax rates had slightly, but significantly, lower support for the Proposition.
The second regression adds two variables intended to measure the extent to which a jurisdiction has the ability to export its property tax burden to nonresidents. Jurisdictions with more renter-occupied housing may shift some tax burden onto absentee landlords. Those with higher employment to population ratios may shift a greater share of the burden onto firms, especially those with nonresident employees, rather than households. Coefficients on both variables have the expected sign . Communities with gre ater cap acity for tax exporting exhibited significantly less support for the tax limitation, also consistent with the nonresident hypothesis. Interestingly, controlling for these tax exporting measures changes the sign of the effect of a jurisdiction's own tax rate. High tax jurisdictions opposing the Proposition were evidently those with high capacity for tax exporting. Higher taxes in surrounding jurisdictions continue to predict greater support for the Proposition, though the effect is slightly reduced in magnitude.
Some part of the neighboring tax rate effect may reflect regional variation in attitudes toward taxation or perceptions of Leviathan government. To explore this possibility, the third regression in Table 2 15 governmental function in Massachusetts and some counties are not contiguous let alone topologically compact. The addition of fixed effects substantially reduces the magnitude of coefficients on both own and neighboring tax rate variables, implying that roughly half of the tax rate effects cannot be empirically distinguished from other factors that vary at the county level. These coefficients retain statistical significance, though only at the 10% level in the case of the neighboring tax rate effect.
The magnitude of coefficients on the tax exporting variables is relatively unaffected by the inclusion of county fixed effects.
The final regression in Table 2 adds a set of average population characteristics for each jurisdiction. Conditional on a community's tax exporting ability, support for a mandated reduction in property tax rates should correlate with demographic factors that reflect either tastes for local public goods or tax prices. 32 In heterogeneous communities, even a tax rate chosen by majority vote will exceed the value most preferred by some residents. Added voter characteristics, based on the 1980 Census, include the share of adults with education beyond the high school level, the nonwhite share of the population, the log of median household income, the percent of individuals residing in households below the poverty line, the share of households with at least one child under the age of 6, the share of households with children exclusively between the ages of 6 and 17, and the share of households headed by an individual over 65 years old. The regressions also control for a measure of voter preferences, the share voting for Ronald Reagan in the presidential election that took place on the same day as the vote for Proposition 2½.
Interpretation of this final regression should be somewhat guarded, as many of the right hand side variables are correlated and may indeed be causally linked. In particular, votes for Reagan and 33
Id.
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initial tax rates may be a function of some of the demographic characteristics included on the right hand side. Nonetheless, it is instructive to examine the demographic correlates of support for Proposition 2½.
Several significant patterns appear in the data. Support for the tax limitation is highly correlated with support for Reagan. Voters in more nonwhite, less educated jurisdictions and in communities with lower poverty rates showed greater support for Proposition 2½. Communities with a higher density of families with young children expressed significantly greater support for the limitation, while those with school-age children did not. Jurisdictions with high concentrations of elderly residents exhibited less support for the Proposition. In general, the evidence suggests that groups associated with lower demand for local public services or higher demand for housing supported the Proposition.
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Controlling for these characteristics, the tendency for voters to support the limitation when surrounding communities have higher tax rates persists, increasing slightly in magnitude and significance relative to the preceding specification. The effect of own tax rate also increases slightly relative to the preceding specification and retain significance. The tax exporting coefficients are smaller in magnitude and lack significance, though they continue to display the predicted sign.
In summary, this table shows evidence consistent with the nonresident hypothesis. Voters surrounded by high tax jurisdictions supported the limitation, while those in communities with higher potential for tax exporting to nonresident landowners or firms exhibited greater opposition.
B. Household Resorting
34 Additional regression evidence, not shown here, shows that jurisdictions more severely constrained by Proposition 2½ experienced more rapid population growth between 1980 and 1990, relative to less constrained communities and to initially high-tax municipalities in Connecticut. This trend occurred despite continuing suburbanization of the population in the greater Boston area. According to US Census microdata, the net outflow of househo lds from M assachusetts to New H ampshire w as greater be tween 198 5-1990 than betwee n 1975 -1980 . It is also notewo rthy, howeve r, that the gross inflo w of househ olds from N ew Ham pshire into M assachusetts d oubled in 1985-90 relative to 1975-80. 17 Tables 3 and 4 Jurisdictions facing mandated property tax rate reductions did not form a random sample of all municipalities in Massachusetts. Controlling for some dimensions of this selection can be accomplished by including relevant covariates in regression models. These covariates include county fixed effects, which restrict analysis to variation within smaller regional areas, measures of (log) po pulation in 1980, and (log) la nd area, effe ctively controlling fo r log den sity.
This set of covariates cannot possibly capture all the dimensions along which towns with 35 The results derived from the two-state sample are substantively similar to those derived from estimation using Ma ssachusetts ob servations o nly.
18
high tax rates in 1980 differed from those with low tax rates. To further combat the potential omitted variable problem, a set of "control" jurisdictions, the 169 towns of Connecticut, have been added to the pool of observations.
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As the summary statistics in appendix table A1 show, jurisdictions in the two states are quite similar along many observable dimensions. The principal difference is that Massachusetts towns with high tax rates in 1980 were forced to reduce them, while
Connecticut towns with similarly high initial rates were not. Any general trends influencing the composition of all places with high property tax rates in 1980 are captured by the first regression covariate listed in Table 3 , which is simply the natural logarithm of the initial tax rate in each community. Compositional shifts related specifically to the mandated reduction of initial tax rates will be reflected in the coefficient on the second variable listed, the log of the mandated change in tax rates brought about by Proposition 2½. This latter variable is set to zero for Connecticut observations.
The final strategy used to control for exogenous changes in population composition involves the creation of a "predicted" change for each attribute of interest. In Table 3 's first and second regressions, which examine the change in percent with high education and percent nonwhite respect ively, the predicted share change is calculated by assuming that statewide group-specific growth trends are mirrored at the local level. In the third regression, the predicted change in share of householders over 65 is derived by simulating the aging process for a jurisdiction's 1980 population, applying nationwide mortality rates taken from Vital Statistics of the United States. Table 4 , which examine the change in the share of households with children, use a prediction based on the 1980 ratio of average cohort size among 1-9 year olds to average cohort size 36 To further analyze the evidence of household resorting by education presented in Table 3 , I assembled panel data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) metro samples for the Boston area in 1977 Boston area in , 1981 Boston area in , 198 5, and 1989 Boston area in . T he 1977 1 surveys qu eried a co nstant set of hou sing units, as did the 1985 a nd 198 9 surveys. T hus it is possible to o bserve turno ver in existing ho using units over the two four-yea r periods, o ne roughly co rrespond ing to the immediate pre-Proposition period and one to the post-Proposition period. In 1977, the AHS interviewed 1,029 households in the city of Boston headed by an individual with no more than a high school diploma. By 1981, 158 of these households, or 15%, had been displaced by households headed by an individual with at least some college education. The comparable displacement rate between 1985 and 1989 was 31.5%. In Boston's suburbs, the preProposition displacement rate was 16% and the post-Proposition displacement rate was 28%, implying a differencein-difference estimate of 4.6%. This estimate is suggestive, but owing to the relatively small sample sizes in the AHS, it is no t statistically significant (t = 1.28). Highly educated households were not only more likely to enter the city of Boston after the proposition; they were also less likely to leave. Of the 592 households with highly educated heads in the c ity of Boston in 1977, 1 8% had been disp laced by less-e ducated h ousehold s in 1981 . The com parable displacement rate between 1985 and 1989 was 11%. In suburban areas, the equivalent rates were 11% in the prePropo sition period , and 14% afterwards, im plying a statistically significa nt difference-in-d ifference estima te of -0.102 (t = -3.4). T ogether, the inc reased inflow and decr eased ou tflow of highly ed ucated ho useholds im ply a steady convergence in the educational composition of the city of Boston and its suburbs. Relative to its suburbs, the city of Boston had a significantly lower share of householders with some college education in the 1977 and 1981 samples (ga ps of 8.3 an d 8.9 pe rcentage p oints, respec tively), but actually ha d a higher sha re in the 198 9 sample. The AHS asks householders who have mo ved in the previous year where their previous residence was. The resulting sample of movers is quite small but reveals interesting patterns. Of the 43 surveyed householders with at least some college education who moved into the city of Boston from another jurisdiction in 1984-'85, thirty (70%) reported a previous residence in the same metro area. For further analysis of the Boston AHS data during this time period, see Jacob L. Vigdor, Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?, Brookings-W harton Papers on Urban Affairs (2002). 37 Here, the "av erage" co nstrained co mmunity is one with the mean m andated lo g prope rty tax rate reduction, -0.24.
Regressions in
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of 10-17 year olds. In all cases, the predicted share changes have significant explanatory power.
The tax rate changes forced upon Massachusetts jurisdictions after 1980 are associated with significant changes in community composit ion between 1980 and 1990. In particular, more highly constrained communities experienced relative increases in the share of residents who were highly educated or nonwhite, and a relative decrease in the share of elderly householders. 36 Nonwhites, a group associated with stronger support for Proposition 2½, increased their share by 1.2 percentage points in the average constrained community relative to the average unconstrained co mmunity. 37 The share of highly educated individuals in the average constrained jurisdiction rose 1 percentage point relative to the share in the av erage unconstrained jurisdiction. The elderly appear to have been displaced in the process of compositional change. Elderly share fell 1 percentage point in the 38 While elderly households are at least anecdotally considered to be the most severely impacted by high property ta xes, evidenc e suggests that the se househo lds also have high dema nd for loca l public goo ds (Cutler et a l. 1993) . Moreover, the benefit of reduced property taxes is most clear for existing residents, for whom the capitalization of tax rates into ho using prices is irre levant. As existing elderly reside nst die off, they are unlikely to be replaced by other elderly households. Vigdor supra note 36 shows that elderly renter ho useholds were mo st likely to report adverse changes in ho using quality and price in the Bosto n area during the 198 0s.
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aver age constrained community relative to the ave rage unconstrained community.
38
Households with children are perhaps the greatest consumers of local public goods, but they also bear greater costs, since their higher demand for housing implies that they have a higher tax price. Table 4 shows a pattern of results that suggest reduced tax prices were an important consideration for at least some households with children. Consistent with the result in Table 2, households with children not yet old enough to enroll in public school display a significant increase in share in constrained communities. Households with only school-aged children neither gravitated toward nor away from constrained jurisdictions.
C. Property Values
Estimation of the relationship between mandated tax rate reductions, initial opposition to Proposition 2½, and property values will use two of the control techniques described in the preceding section. First, the same set of covariates employed in Table 4 appear as right-hand-side variables in the value regressions, reported in Table 5 . Second, Connecticut observations are included as "controls," to separate the effect of having forced tax rate reductions from the effect of having high property tax rates in 1980. Table 5 examines two different measures of property value growth in each jurisdiction:
change in the equalized tax base and change in the median owner-occupied housing value reported in the decennial Census. The first measure captures changes in both the quantity and price of real 39 Other authors (Lang and Jian supra note 20; Bradbury, Case and Mayer supra note 1) raise concerns that tax base data from Massachusetts is systematically understated in high-tax jurisdictions prior to Proposition 2½, and that the incentive s for underre porting wer e dramatic ally lessened b y the limitation. Lo w equalized value per ca pita is one criterio n used in the d etermination of state aid to lo calities in Ma ssachusetts, thus c ommunitie s interested in maximizing intergovernmental revenue have incentives to report underestimates of market value to the state. The passage of Proposition 2½ changed these incentives, since communities could minimize the revenue impact of cutting tax rates by increasing the tax base, rather than decreasing their levy. Once a city or town's tax levy was below 2.5%, these large incentives to inflate the tax base disappeared, since the statutory limit on growth in tax collections prevented local governments from reaping the benefits. This concern with the assessment statistics is one reason for corrob orating the results with data on Census-repo rted housing values.
40 Housing v alue is a self-repo rted assessm ent of the price a prope rty would rec eive if placed on the mark et. 42 Vigdor supra note 36 discusses gentrification in the Boston metropolitan area during this time period.
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property in a jurisdiction, both residential and nonresidential. 39 The second is based on ownerreported estimates of value, omitting both renter-occupied and vacant housing units.
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The coefficient estimates are remarkably similar across specifications, suggesting that the effect of tax limitations on the price of owner-occupied housing, theoretically indeterminate according to the nonresident hypothesis, is quite similar to the effect on non-owner occupied and nonresidential propert y.
The first regression in Table 5 The second regression introduces an interaction between the mandated tax rate reduction variable and the share of voters favoring Proposition 2½. The voting measure is set to zero for observations in Connecticut. The second and fourth regressions in Table 6 show that using either dependent variable, value appreciation was greater in communities that initially opposed the tax limitation measure. As support for the limitation grows, the estimated relationship between mandated tax cuts and growth becomes weaker. In the Massachusetts jurisdictions displaying the greatest support for the Proposition -85 towns exhibited 65% or greater support -the point estimates suggest that value growth is essentially unrelated to mandated tax rate reductions. In the 23 towns where at least 60% of voters opposed the limitation, the estimated effect of tax rate reductions on subsequent growth is 2.5 to four times the initial point estimates reported in the regressions without interaction terms.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper argues that statewide property tax limitations can be interpreted as efforts by voters to influence tax and spending decisions in jurisdictions where they would otherwise have no voting power. In theory, voters' interest in limiting taxes in neighboring jurisdictions can be explained by nonresident employment, nonresident landownership, and the desire of some marginal residents to alter the characteristics of the choice set they faced. Empirically, there is some evidence to support each of these hypotheses, in patterns of voter support for the Proposition, and in residential resorting and property value increases in its wake.
Are propert y tax limitations efficiency enhancing? The basic message of the nonresident hypothesis is that they can be. Statewide limitations offer local jurisdictions an opportunity to solve a prisoner's dilemma, wherein each jurisdiction initially follows a dominant strategy to charge high property tax rates when a significant portion of the tax burden can be exported.
The distributional implications of the nonresident hypothesis are somewhat less positive.
Whereas existing explanations point to potential Pareto improvements made by limitations, the nonresident hypothesis suggests that tax limitations can create losers as well as winners. The "winners" are those individuals who either own property in other jurisdictions, or commute to work in a different jurisdiction. This group most likely represents an affluent segment of society. The "losers" were most likely households, especially renters, in jurisdictions with a considerable amount of commercial and industrial property. These individuals witnessed a reduction in local public spending accompanied by a substantial run-up in property values. Indeed, newspaper coverage in the post-Proposition era often portrays longtime residents of city neighborhoods who have been priced out of the market in the process of gentrification. The consequences of property tax limitations may theref ore e xtend well beyond the widely-studied effe cts on public servi ce qu ality. Note: Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Initial tax rate and tax base figures taken from 1980 data in Massachusetts, FY1981 data in Connecticut. "Predicted Change in Share" is calculated by assuming statewide group-specific growth trends are mirrored at the local level in the second and third regressions. In the fourth, the predicted change in share is derived by aging the 1980 population forward ten years, applying nationwide mortality rates. ** denotes a coefficient significant at the 5% level, * the 10% level. Note: Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Initial tax rate and tax base figures taken from 1980 data in Massachusetts, FY1981 data in Connecticut. Predicted changes in share and students per capita are based on the 1980 ratio of average cohort size of 1-9 year olds to average cohort size of 10-17 year olds in each jurisdiction. ** denotes a coefficient significant at the 5% level, * the 10% level. 
